Morsi and U.S.–Egypt–Israeli Relations: Washington’s Cairo Prism

CAIRO & WASHINGTON — Since the signing of the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty following the Camp David Accords, American foreign policy in the Arab world has rested on a foundational strategic pillar: bilateral military and economic assistance to Cairo paired with the preservation of regional security guarantees along the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza border.

Following the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the June 2012 election of President Mohamed Morsi, diplomats and policy analysts questioned whether a Muslim Brotherhood-led administration in Cairo would rupture the three-decade triangular framework linking Washington, Cairo, and Jerusalem.

"Viewing Cairo Through the Prism of Israel"

As Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Steven A. Cook observed in his foundational study of U.S.–Egyptian relations, "Washington would almost always view Cairo through the prism of Israel." Throughout late 2012 and early 2013, that strategic prism remained decisive.

When cross-border escalation erupted in Gaza in November 2012, the Morsi government’s intelligence services—maintaining institutional channels established under previous administrations—brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that earned public praise from the U.S. State Department. At the same time, mounting domestic unrest inside Egypt—from Port Said and Suez to Tahrir Square—exposed the fragility of an approach that prioritized external border quiet over internal constitutional consensus and economic stabilization.

"According to Steven A. Cook, 'Washington would almost always view Cairo through the prism of Israel'—a strategic calculus tested by both the 2012 Gaza ceasefire mediation and Egypt's deepening domestic crisis."